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YOU CAN CALL ME A "BITCH" JUST DON'T USE THE
"N-WORD": SOME THOUGHTS ON GALLOWAY V.
GENERAL MOTORS SERVICE PARTS
OPERATIONS AND RODGERS V.
WESTERN-SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Robert J. Gregory*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an individual with respect to his or her "com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' It has
been clear, since at least 1986, that the phrase "terms, conditions or
privileges of employment" in Title VII "'is an expansive concept
which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
[hostile or abusive] working environment.' ''2 It has also been clear,
since that time, that Title VII extends equally to claims of sexual and
racial discrimination based on a hostile working environment. 3 Courts
have accepted the view that claims of racial and sexual "harassment,"
to use the common parlance, are governed by the same legal
standards.4
Despite the uniform standards applied to claims of racial and sexual
harassment, there are strong indications that courts are not in practice
* Senior Appellate Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 1985, Creighton University. This Article was written
in the author's private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or any other agency of the United States government is
intended or should be inferred.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). I use the term "Title VII" throughout this Article in
referring to the employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
3. Id. at 65-66. Title VII also prohibits conduct that creates a hostile working environment on
the basis of religion or national origin. See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) §§ 615.7(a)-(b) (Jan.
1982) ("[T]he EEOC has long recognized that harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, or
national origin is an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII.... [T]he principles
involved with regard to sexual harassment [also] apply to harassment on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin."). This Article focuses on race- and sex-based claims of hostile envi-
ronment discrimination.
4. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing the legal standards for claims of
racial and sexual harassment).
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assessing these claims on the same terms.5 The critical inquiry in cases
of hostile environment harassment is whether the harassing behavior
is, first, race- or sex-based and, second, "sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment."'6 In the race
context, courts seem particularly receptive to claims that racially
harassing behavior has affected the terms or conditions of an individ-
ual's employment, resolving any ambiguities in favor of the claimant
and de-emphasizing the need for any specific number of instances of
harassment.7 In the sex context, the judicial reaction seems less solici-
tous, with courts more often stressing the ambiguities in the conduct
at issue and the need for repeated instances of harassing conduct.8
This legal dichotomy is exposed by two recent decisions in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 9 In each of
these cases, the court was confronted with the use of an epithet di-
rected at the complaining party. In Galloway v. General Motors Ser-
vice Parts Operations, the plaintiff had been "repeatedly" called a
"sick bitch" by one of her co-workers over a period of four years. 10 In
Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff's super-
visor had referred to the plaintiff as a "nigger" on two occasions dur-
ing the plaintiff's twelve years of employment.11 The court in
Galloway ruled that there was no "sexual innuendo or gender slur in
'sick bitch' and that the harassing behavior was, in any event, "too
tepid or intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person be-
lieve that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her
sex."' 2 The court in Rodgers ruled that the term "nigger" was "unam-
biguously" racist and its use, even on a few occasions, sufficiently se-
vere to affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.13
This Article explores the issues raised by the Galloway and Rodgers
decisions. The Article focuses, in particular, on whether there are jus-
tifications for the disparate result in these two cases, which seem to
raise similar claims of race- and sex-based discrimination. I conclude
that while there may be some grounds for viewing the harassment in
5. This point is discussed at infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
6. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67).
7. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273-75 (7th Cir. 1991).
8. See, e.g., Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1993).
9. See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996); Rod-
gers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
10. 78 F.3d at 1165. The co-worker also made an obscene gesture at the plaintiff and urged
her to "suck this, bitch." Id.
11. 12 F.3d at 671. The supervisor had also made the comment on one occasion, in the plain-
tiff's presence, that "'[y]ou black guys are too fucking dumb to be insurance agents."' Id.
12. 78 F.3d at 1168.
13. 12 F.3d at 675.
[Vol. 46:741
1997] THOUGHTS ON GALLOWAY AND RODGERS 743
Rodgers as more "severe," these grounds do not justify the tolerance
shown to the sexual epithets at issue in Galloway. My aim here is not
simply to isolate the court's decisions in these two cases but to use
these cases to make a broader point about the disparate judicial re-
sponse to claims of racial and sexual harassment. In my view, the case
law reveals a judicial tolerance of sexual harassment that has no ana-
log in the area of racial harassment and which leaves working women
without the full protection of the law.
I. BACKGROUND: RACIAL AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN PRACTICE
As originally proposed, Title VII focused principally on the issue of
race discrimination. The prohibition against sex discrimination "was
added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives," with little legislative debate.14 It is not surprising,
given this history, that much of the early case law under Title VII
focused on claims of race discrimination. Thus, one of the first deci-
sions to address a claim of a hostile work environment, Rogers v.
EEOC,15 was a race/national origin case. In that case, the court ruled
that a workplace "heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion" can affect the terms or conditions of an individual's employment
and, thus, give rise to a Title VII violation.16
While the hostile environment theory had its origins in claims of a
racially abusive working environment, the theory quickly spread to
the area of sexual harassment. In 1980, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC") issued guidelines on sexual harass-
ment discrimination. The EEOC specified that unlawful sexual
harassment consists of "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"
that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment."' 7
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,18 the Supreme Court largely en-
dorsed the EEOC's approach to the sexual harassment theory. The
Court confirmed that Title VII "affords employees the right to work
in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
14. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
15. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
16. Id. at 238.
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1996).
18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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insult."'19 Noting that courts had applied this principle "to harassment
based on race," the Court stressed that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests
that a hostile working environment based on discriminatory sexual
harassment should not be likewise prohibited. 20 The Court ruled
that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment. '112
Since Vinson, it has been clear that claims of racial and sexual har-
assment stand on the same legal footing. The EEOC has stated that
the liability principles for hostile environment claims apply with
"equal validity" to claims of racial and sexual harassment.22 Courts
have overwhelmingly applied the same legal standards in passing upon
claims of racial and sexual harassment. 23 Courts have stressed that
"Title VII 'on its face treats each of the enumerated categories [in-
cluding race and sex] exactly the same."' 24 Therefore, there is no rea-
son to apply different "elements of proof . . . in a Title VII claim
arising with a racially hostile work environment than in a case of sex-
ual harassment within the workplace. '2 5
While these judicial pronouncements suggest a level playing field
for the assertion of claims of racial and sexual harassment, they do not
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id. at 66.
21. Id.
22. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.7(b) (Jan. 1982).
23. See, e.g., Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 80 F.3d 1107,
1118 (6th Cir.) (stating that "the elements and burden of proof that a Title VII plaintiff must
meet are the same for racially charged harassment as for sexually charged harassment"), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 169 (1996); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995)
("The [Supreme] Court has recognized no difference in standards applicable to racially and sexu-
ally hostile work environments."); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270-72 (7th Cir.
1991) (viewing the standards applied to claims of racial and sexual harassment as interchangea-
ble). In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that Title
VII is violated when "'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult"' is "'sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment."' Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). The
Court stressed that, in determining whether a work environment is sufficiently "hostile or abu-
sive," a court must examine "all the circumstances," applying both an objective and subjective
standard. Id. at 23 (stressing that the environment must be one that both the claimant herself
and "a reasonable person" would find hostile or abusive). The Court indicated that the test for
determining the existence of a hostile environment-which, the Court held, does not require a
showing that the harassment caused psychological injury-applies equally to claims of harass-
ment based on "race, gender, religion, or national origin." Id. at 22; see also id. at 26 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (stressing that "Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race, gender,
religion, or national origin equally unlawful").
24. Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 485 (6th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989) (plurality)).
25. Id. (citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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answer the question of whether courts in practice accord the same
treatment to such claims. Courts may agree that claims of racial and
sexual harassment are to be judged under the same legal standards.
Do they, however, apply these standards in the way that leads to equal
levels of protection?
There are at least two ways of measuring a court's response to a
claim of hostile environment discrimination. First, a hostile environ-
ment claim is viable only if the harassment is based on a prohibited
factor, in this case, race or sex.26 Title VII does not prohibit conduct,
no matter how egregious, that is not tied to one or more of the stat-
ute's enumerated categories of discrimination. 27 Second, assuming
that the harassment is race- or sex-based, the harassment must be
"'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.' ' 28 An iso-
lated instance of "non-severe misconduct" will not support a hostile
environment claim.29
Turning to the first of these "measures," there are strong indications
that courts are substantially inclined, in the race context, to resolve
any ambiguities concerning the racial nature of the harassment in
favor of the plaintiff. Thus, courts have inferred race discrimination
from a noose hanging over the plaintiff's work station, 30 from the use
of the term "Buckwheat," 31 from the use of term "spooks," 32 from the
use of the term "tight eye" (in the case of a race claim based on Asian
ancestry), 33 from the use of the word "boy," 34 and from the statement
26. EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F2d. 1312, 1316 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that discrimi-
nation directed at anyone other than a member of a suspect class is not prohibited by Title VII).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (stating that Title VII prohibits an employer from taking
adverse employment action "with respect to" an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin"); see also Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Title
VII is not violated by the exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment."); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (stressing that "Title VII is not a clean language act").
28. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). It is
significant that the Supreme Court has said that harassment must be sufficiently "severe or per-
vasive" to be actionable. Id. (emphasis added). This indicates that pervasiveness is "inversely
related" to "severity," such that "the greater the severity of the individual incidents, the fewer
there need to be actionable (and vice versa)." EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F.
Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); see also EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6681, at 6690 (Apr. 1990) (stating that "the more severe the harass-
ment, the less need to show a repetitive series of incidents").
29. Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1993).
30. Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989).
31. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991).
32. Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981).
33. Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 1989).
34. Ruffin v. Great Dane Trailers, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 684, 688 (N.D. Ala. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 969 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1992).
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that "you must think you're back in Arkansas chasing jackrabbits. ' 35
The use of the term "nigger," in particular, has been viewed as inher-
ently racist and offensive. As one court stated: "The use of the word
'nigger' automatically separates the person addressed from every non-
black person; this is discrimination per se."'36
In the context of sexual harassment, courts have also been willing to
infer discrimination from a wide variety of sexual comments and con-
duct.37 Still, there are indications that courts are less willing to resolve
ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff. Courts, for example, have held
that even the most coarse sexual discourse or behavior does not result
in conduct that is "sex-based. ' 38 Courts, in particular, have insisted
upon specific proof that the conduct stems from an anti-male or -fe-
male animus.39 Courts have also stressed that instances of sexual con-
35. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 631 (E.D. Wis. 1992), affd,
12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d
Cir. 1996) (dealing with a racial harassment claim that was supported by such "inherently racist
remarks" as "another one," "one of them," "that one in there," and "all of you," made in refer-
ence to African-American employees).
36. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923,927 (N.D. III. 1984); see also Walker v. Ford Motor Co.,
684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the use of the word "nigger-rigged" was race-
based despite contention that the term was not "intended to carry racial overtones").
37. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (viewing
the terms "dumb fucking broads" and "fucking cunts" as sex-based); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons
Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling that "a man calling a woman a whore"
is sex-based, since it "reduce[s] her to an illicit sexual being").
38. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1542 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the statement "sometimes don't you just want to smash a woman in the face" was a result of the
supervisor's "frustration" with a female employee, not "gender discrimination"); Murray v. Wal-
Mart Stores, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 850, 853-54 (D. Kan. 1993) (ruling that the alleged
harassment, which included a reference to the plaintiff as a "cow" and comments on her breasts,
was not "motivated by sex"); Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. Ga.) (ruling
that a male co-worker's statement, "You cold northern bitch. Why don't you give us southern
boys a break and say yes once in a while?" was not sexual harassment because it "was not
necessarily meant in a sexual way"), affid, 948 F.3d 731 (11th Cir. 1991); Ebert v. Lamar Truck
Plaza, 715 F. Supp. 1496, 1498-99 (D. Colo. 1987) (holding the female plaintiffs failed to establish
that harassment "was based on their sex," despite evidence of "foul language" and "unwelcome
touching" by male employees), affd, 878 F.3d 338 (10th Cir. 1989).
39. See, e.g., Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
sexual harassment is "tantamount" to "sex discrimination" when the harassment "includes con-
duct evidently calculated to drive someone out of the workplace" because of her gender); Van-
deventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (refusing to find
that harassment was sex-based absent proof that "abuse was based on the 'harasser's' disdain for
the victim's gender"); Hinton v. Methodist Hosps., 779 F. Supp. 956, 960-61 (N.D. Ind. 1991)
(finding that a reference to the plaintiff's pubic hair was not actionable "sexual" harassment
absent proof that the comment was made with an intent of denying plaintiff, as a woman, "an
equal footing in the workplace"); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(stating that it is not enough that the harassment had "sexual overtones" or that the plaintiff was
harassed "because of" his sex; rather, there must be proof of an "anti-male" environment, as
evidenced by conduct that "fosters a sense of degradation in the victim by attacking their [sic]
sexuality"); cf. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (stressing
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duct "that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would
not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge," 40 a principle that
appears to have no analog in the race context.41 Courts have sug-
gested that even the most "gendered" conduct is not discriminatory if
the harasser is motivated by a personal dislike, rather than a sexual
animus.42 In contrast to race cases, where animus is typically inferred
from the statement or conduct itself, courts in sex cases seem far more
willing to probe the context of the statement or conduct and the un-
derlying motivation of the individual engaging in the harassing
behavior.43
A similar discrepancy is evident with respect to the requirement
that the harassing behavior be sufficiently severe or pervasive. As an
initial matter, courts in the race context show a marked intolerance to
the notion that the impact of a racist slur can be diminished by its
common usage in the workplace or society at large. Courts have
stressed that "while Title VII does not require an employer to fire all
'Archie Bunkers' in its employ, the law does require that an employer
that an "intent to discriminate" might be found to be implicit in the use of racially suggestive
"'code words').
40. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); accord A. Sam & Sons
Produce Co., Inc., 872 F. Supp. at 36 & n.14.
41. No court has suggested that the use of a racial epithet, like "nigger," would not be "race-
based" if a Caucasian employee in the workplace was equally offended by the term. Courts, in
fact, have recognized that even a seemingly race-neutral term can evoke pejorative meanings for
African-American employees that it does not for Caucasian employees. See Ruffin v. Great
Dane Trailers, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (BNA) 684, 688 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (stating that the use
of the word "Rondo" in reference to the plaintiff could be viewed as racially tinged "given the
historical basis of black people frequently being referred to... by first names when others were
not"), rev'd on other grounds, 969 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co.,
50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the supervisor's use of the word "tilly" in reference
to a woman did not create a hostile working environment); Paape v. Wall Data, Inc., 934 F. Supp.
969, 977 (N.D. I1. 1996) (ruling that a male manager's repeated reference to female employees
as "dumb blonds" could not support a reasonable inference that the alleged harassment was sex-
based).
42. See, e.g., Huebschen v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1169, 1171-
72 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that gender "was merely coincidental" to a manager's "sexually in-
sulting" behavior and spiteful conduct, perpetrated in response to an employee's refusal to ac-
cede to the manager's sexual advances, where the manager was upset at the employee personally
for having "jilted her"); Murray v. Wal-Mart Stores, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 850, 854 (D.
Kan. 1993) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by another woman suggests that
references to the plaintiff's breasts were "motivated by a bias against plaintiff personally, not
against plaintiff as a woman"); Morley v. New England Tel. Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
917, 924 (D. Mass. 1987) (ruling that statements, while carrying "sexual overtones," were based
on a "personality conflict" rather than the plaintiff's sex); cf. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-
92 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that because the plaintiff "welcomed" the harassment, the "language
and sexually explicit jokes were used around plaintiff because of her personality rather than her
sex") (citations omitted).
43. See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
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take prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing their opin-
ions in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers." 44 Courts have
stated that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. ' 45 Courts have
viewed racist epithets as beyond the pale, regardless of the prevalence
of these epithets in the workplace. 46
In the sex context, on the other hand, courts seem much more will-
ing to acquiesce in the common mores of the workplace or society.
Courts have stressed that Title VII was not "designed to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers. '47
Courts have stated that a court must consider "the lexicon of obscen-
ity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and
after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, '48 meaning that the
more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult to prove that the sexual
conduct is sufficiently severe to affect the terms or conditions of an
individual's employment. Courts have cautioned that employers "can-
not be saddled with the insurmountable task of conforming all em-
ployee conduct at all times to the dictates of Title VII. ' '49 As one
court has intoned: "The [workplace] ... is a complex and diversified
community in which employees work closely and continuously in each
other's presence over long hours, during which, experience has shown,
inappropriate conduct appears from time to time."'50
There is also a pronounced tendency, in the area of racial harass-
ment, to de-emphasize the number of incidents of harassment neces-
sary to sustain a hostile environment claim. Thus, courts have stressed
that the Title VII plaintiff does not prove "the existence of a hostile
working environment by alleging some 'magic' threshold number of
incidents," nor may an employer "rebut a claim simply by saying that
44. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988).
45. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
46. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (showing that the term
"nigger-rigged" was "a common term in the car business" did not defeat the plaintiff's claim of
racial harassment).
47. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Rabidue v. Osce-
ola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
48. Id. at 620; see also Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination must be evaluated "in the context of a
blue[-]collar environment where crude language is commonly used"); Baskerville v. Culligan
Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing whether workplace harassment can be
considered "distressing" must be examined in light of "contemporary American popular culture
in all its sex-saturated vulgarity").
49. Spicer v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1995).
50. Id.
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the number of incidents alleged is too few."'51 Courts have admon-
ished that "[d]rawing a distinction between 'isolated incidents' and a
'pattern of harassment' does not advance the analysis; the plaintiff
need not prove that the instances of alleged harassment were related
in either time or type."'52 Courts have stressed that because racial epi-
thets are not "mere insults,... petty oppressions, or other trivialities,"
their use, on even a few occasions, is actionable. 53
In sex cases, courts rarely employ this generous language. Courts
have suggested, on occasion, that a single incident of sexual harass-
ment can be sufficient to sustain a hostile environment claim, particu-
larly where the conduct is of a physical nature.54 Yet, courts have
been willing to flunk the plaintiff's case, on the severity issue, even in
cases involving multiple incidents of physical harassment.55 More typ-
ically, courts emphasize the need for repetition of the objectionable
conduct. 56 Courts have stated that "'[i]solated and/or trivial remarks
51. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991); see also West v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 757 (3d Cir. 1995) (stressing with respect to "racially harassing com-
ments" that "frequency is a factor to be considered, but it is to be considered in context,
including the severity of the incidents").
52. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d-345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988).
53. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 932-34 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (citations omitted); see also
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding a hostile
working environment was supported by a few incidents of race-based harassment, including two
incidents in which a noose was hung over the plaintiffs work station); BARBARA L. SCHLEI &
PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAanON LAW (5-yr. cum. supp. 1989) (stating that
"[elvidence of a single egregious racial slur [may be] sufficent to present a triable issue of fact").
54. See King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990);
Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D. Neb. 1983), affd, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.
1984).
55. See, e.g., Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993); Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 715 F. Supp. 1496, 1499 (D.
Colo. 1987).
56. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Applicance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that "[t]he [harassing] incidents must be repeated and continuous"); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 n.7 (6th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that harassment must be "systematically
directed to the plaintiff over a protracted period of time"); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798
F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (ruling that offensive comments and conduct of co-workers were
"too isolated and lacking the repetitive and debilitating effect necessary to maintain a hostile
environment claim"); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
isolated incidents of harassment are not sufficient to establish a violation; the harassment must
be sustained and nontrivial); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating "a
pattern of offensive conduct must be proved"); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495,
501-02 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (stressing that the incidents of sexual conduct "must be persistent, not
isolated" and that "generally the case law requires a sexual discrimination plaintiff to have been
subjected to continued explicit propositions of sexual epithets or persistent offensive touchings
to make out a hostile work environment claim").
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of a sexual nature' do not satisfy the definition of sexual harassment:
'the offensive conduct must be persistent.' ' 57
As this discussion makes clear, the fact that courts apply the same
legal standards in assessing claims of racial and sexual harassment
does not mean that these claims are treated in the same fashion in
practice. There are indications that courts respond more favorably to
claims of racial, as opposed to sexual, harassment, shading the issues
of discriminatory animus and severity in the plaintiff's favor. The re-
sult of this approach is to provide different levels of protection against
conduct that is, at least arguably, of a similar nature.58
II. THE DECISIONS: RODGERS AND GALLOWAY
The above discussion provides the backdrop for the consideration
of the Rodgers and Galloway decisions. In this section, I briefly dis-
cuss the facts and holdings of these cases.
A. Rodgers: Striking down the Racial Epithet
Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co.59 involved a claim
of a racially hostile work environment. The plaintiff, James Rodgers,
worked for the defendant, as an insurance agent and associate sales
manager, for twelve years. 60 During much of his tenure, Rodgers
toiled under the supervision of William Mann. 61 The evidence showed
that Mann was an oppressive supervisor, who repeatedly used insult-
ing language, referring to Rodgers and other sales agents, Caucasian
and African-American alike, as "knobheads," "knuckleheads," "dun-
derheads," and "goons. ' 62
57. Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Downes, 775 F.2d at 293); see
also McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the har-
assment was not actionable because it involved only "three sexually suggestive comments over a
three-month period").
58. I do not mean to imply by this recitation that the disparity between the judiciary's reaction
to claims of racial and sexual harassment is absolute. There are race cases where courts have
rejected the plaintiff's claim, notwithstanding the use of overtly racist language. See Bolden v.
PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1995) (stressing that there must be "a steady barrage of
opprobrious racial comments") (citations omitted). There are also sex cases where courts have
responded with great sensitivity to evidence that might appear less than compelling. See Bennett
v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a one-time posting
of cartoons depicting the plaintiff in an obscene fashion could support a claim of hostile environ-
ment discrimination). My point is that, in the aggregate, the cases reveal disparities on the issues
of "animus" and "severity" based on the type of harassment (race or sex) at issue.
59. 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
60. Id. at 671.
61. Id. at 670-71.
62. Id. at 671.
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Rodgers based his claim on a relatively small number of incidents of
racial harassment. There was evidence that Mann had twice used the
word "nigger" in Rodgers' presence.63 The evidence also showed that
on another occasion Mann had made the comment that "'[y]ou black
guys are too fucking dumb to be insurance agents,"' while speaking
derisively about the employment prospects of African-American ap-
plicants. 64 Rodgers maintained that he quit his employment because
of Mann's abusive behavior, citing specifically to the racially deroga-
tory comments. 65 Rodgers asserted a claim for constructive discharge
based on the racial harassment.66
The case was tried in the district court, which ruled in Rodgers'
favor.67 The court stated that in ruling upon Rodgers' hostile environ-
ment claim, it was required to take into account "the likely effect of a
defendant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his
or her work and upon his or her well-being, as well as the actual effect
upon the particular plaintiff bringing the claim."'68 The court empha-
sized that in making this determination, a court "must avoid placing
undue weight on the simple number of harassing incidents inflicted
upon the plaintiff" since "[t]he number of instances of harassment is
but one factor to be considered in the examination of the totality of
the circumstances. '69 While noting that "much of Mann's verbal
abuse was race-neutral," the court found "that Mann's racist com-
ments to Rodgers were so racially derogatory that they impaired his
ability to do his job and would have similarly affected any reasonable
employee. '70 The court also sustained Rodgers' constructive dis-
charge claim, finding that "Mann's racist comments and taunts con-
tributed significantly to the stress condition that prevented Rodgers
from continuing to perform his job."'71 The court awarded Rodgers
over $100,000 in monetary damages. 72
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a finding of either a hostile work environment or a construc-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 630 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
66. Rodgers, 12 F.2d at 672.
67. Rodgers, 792 F. Supp. at 628.
68. Id. at 633 (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989)).
69. Id. at 633-34 (quoting Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991)).
70. Id. at 634-35.
71. Id. at 635.
72. See Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1993).
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tive discharge. 73 The court of appeals rejected both contentions, af-
firming the district court's decision in all respects. 74
In ruling in Rodgers' favor, the Seventh Circuit stressed that the
critical inquiry was whether the objectionable statements were suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to "alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment. ' 75 The court agreed with the
district court that "[w]ithin the totality of circumstances, there is
neither a threshold 'magic number' of harassing incidents that gives
rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of
incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a
claim."' 76 The court acknowledged that there was not a "pervasive
pattern" of harassment but held that the isolated nature of the inci-
dents did not, as a matter of law, defeat the claim.77
Significantly, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the district court erred "in finding that Mann's use of the
word 'nigger' contributed to a hostile work environment. ' 78 The de-
fendant urged the court "to consider the context in which that word
was used," noting that "Rodgers could not recall the precise context in
which [Mann used the word]" and that "black employees, including
Thomas and Rodgers himself, also used this word in the workplace. '79
The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that "no single
act can more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment' than the use of an unambiguously
racial epithet such as 'nigger' by a supervisor in the presence of his
subordinates. '80 Referring to the use of the word "nigger" as "dis-
crimination per se," the court observed that "[t]he fact that black em-
ployees also may have spoken the term 'nigger' does not mitigate the
harm caused by Mann's use of that epithet; a supervisor's use of the
term impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-
equals." 81
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the district
court committed error in "finding that Mann's statement '[y]ou black
guys are too fucking dumb to be insurance agents' contributed to a
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 675 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
76. Id. at 674.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 675.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted)).
81. Id.
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racially hostile work environment. '1 2 Again, the defendant asked the
court "to place the statement in context: it was an isolated statement
used as a motivational technique at least six months prior to Rodgers'
resignation. ' 83 The court was unmoved by this argument, stating that
"Title VII does not permit supervisors to use this type of blanket criti-
cism of the intelligence of a racially-defined class of employees as a
motivational technique. '84 Noting that "the six[-]month lapse be-
tween Mann's utterance of the statement and Rodgers' resignation
does not sever the causal connection between the statement and the
resignation," the court concluded that the district court properly con-
sidered "the cumulative weight" of the "'isolated' racial comments" in
"examining the 'totality of the circumstances' giving rise to Rodgers'
action. "85
Finally, the court of appeals upheld the district court's finding of a
constructive discharge. 86 The court ruled that the racially hostile envi-
ronment created by Mann constituted the type of "aggravated" dis-
crimination that justified a finding that Rodgers was compelled to quit
his employment.87 The court rejected the defendant's contention that
the severity of Mann's racial comments was diminished by the fact
that Mann was generally abusive, in a race-neutral manner, toward
Rodgers and others. The court was persuaded "that Mann's racist
comments and taunts, though perhaps not the sole factor, contributed
significantly to the stress condition that compelled Rodgers to
resign." 88
B. Galloway: Marginalizing the Sexual Epithet
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations89 involved a
claim of a sexually hostile work environment. The plaintiff, Rochelle
Galloway, worked as a packer in the defendant's parts department.90
During the last four years of her employment, from 1987 to 1991, Gal-
loway suffered verbal harassment at the hands of a co-worker, Bul-
lock, with whom she had previously been romantically involved.91
The evidence showed that "Bullock repeatedly called [Galloway] a
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 677.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
90. Id. at 1165.
91. Id.
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'sick bitch,' the 'sick' apparently a reference to the fact that in 1986
and 1987 Galloway was hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder. ' 92 Bul-
lock once remarked to Galloway, in 1988, "If you don't want me bitch,
you won't have a damn thing," and once, in 1990, "made an obscene
gesture at her and said 'suck this, bitch."' 93
Galloway contended that the defendant violated Title VII by failing
to take prompt steps to remedy Bullock's harassment. 94 The defend-
ant moved for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that the conduct
alleged by Galloway was not sufficient to sustain a finding of a hostile
work environment.95 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, ruling, in part, that the "repetitions of 'sick
bitch'.., were not enough to make Galloway's working environment
objectively hostile to her as a woman. ' 96 The court opined:
The term "sick bitch" was "not overtly sexual in nature" and that
Galloway's own coarse remarks to Bullock and others, such as her
statement to him to "take that nasty dick and stick it in [your]
momma's mouth," indicated that she probably wasn't much upset
by his allegedly harassing behavior. 97
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 98 The court, per Chief Judge Posner, rejected the "district
judge's decision to cut off ... the evidence [of harassment] in 1991,"
based on when Galloway filed her charge.99 The court also disagreed
with the district court's "suggestion that the plaintiff's use of dirty lan-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. In cases of co-worker harassment, an employer is liable only if, knowing or having
reason to know of the harassment, it fails to take adequate steps to redress it. See Guess v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying a negligence standard resem-
bling the "fellow servant" rule and distinguishing the chosen standard from earlier cases which
relied on respondeat superior); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1512 (11th
Cir. 1989) (using respondeat superior as a basis for liability); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th
Cir. 1983) (requiring a showing of the employer's responsibility for the acts of an employee
under the theory of respondeat superior); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995).
95. Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, No. 92 C 5987, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16902 (N.D, II1. Nov. 23, 1994).
96. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1168.
99. Id. at 1167. The district court had "ruled that any acts of harassment committed prior to
... the three hundredth day before Galloway filed her charge ... were time-barred." Id. at 1165.
The court of appeals ruled that a plaintiff may base her suit "on conduct that occurred outside
the statute of limitations" if
it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on
that conduct, as in a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as
actionable harassment only in light of events that occurred later, within the period of
the statute of limitations.
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guage shows that she was not harmed by her co[-]worker's use of such
language."' 100 The court, however, agreed with the district court that
the harassment identified by Galloway was not sufficient to sustain
her claim. 1 1
The court first ruled that the term "'sick bitch-and, we add, the
other verbal abuse, and the obscene gesture, that Bullock directed to-
ward Galloway-was, in context, not a sex- or gender-related
term."' 0 2 The court acknowledged that "'bitch' is rarely used of heter-
osexual males (though some heterosexual male teenagers have taken
recently to calling each other 'bitch')" but stated that "it does not nec-
essarily connote some specific female characteristic, whether true,
false, or stereotypical."'1 3 Specifically, "it does not draw attention to
the woman's sexual or maternal characteristics or to other respects in
which women might be thought to be inferior to men in the work-
place, or unworthy of equal dignity and respect."'1 4 In the court's
view, "[i]n its normal usage, [bitch] is simply a pejorative term for
'woman." ' 10 5 The court conjectured that if "Bullock had called Gallo-
way a 'sick woman,' and a similarly situated male co[-]worker a 'sick
man,' there would be no ground for an inference of sex discrimina-
tion.' 0 6 Likewise, "were there a similarly situated male worker to
Galloway whom Bullock called a 'sick bastard' while calling her a 'sick
bitch,' we do not think it would be rational for a trier of fact to infer
that Bullock was making the workplace more uncongenial for women
than for men."' 0 7 While noting that the term "'bitch' is sometimes
used as a label for women who possess such 'woman faults' as 'ill-
temper, selfishness, malice, cruelty, and spite,' and latterly as a label
for women considered by some men to be too aggressive or careerist,"
the court stated that "[w]hen a word is ambiguous, context is every-
thing." 0 8 The court determined that because "there would not be an
automatic inference from [Bullock's] use of the word 'bitch' that his
abuse of a woman was motivated by her gender rather than by a per-
sonal dislike unrelated to gender," Galloway could not sustain her
100. Id. The court stated "that there is no principle of law, or for that matter of psychology,
that decrees that the use of bad language automatically demonstrates the user's insensitivity to
like language directed against himself or herself." Id.
101. Id. at 1168.
102. Id. at 1167.
103. Id. at 1168.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Beverly Gross, Bitch, SALMAGUNDI, Summer 1994, at 146, 150).
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claim in the absence of specific proof that Bullock used the term with
one of its "gendered" connotations 109
The court also concluded that Galloway's claim failed even if there
was "some sexual innuendo or gender slur in 'sick bitch."' 110 The
court stated that Title VII does not reach harassing conduct that is
"too tepid or intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person
believe that she has been discriminated against on the basis of her
sex." ''  Noting that "Bullock repeated 'sick bitch' to Galloway some
indefinite number of times over a period of four years in the context
of a failed sexual relationship," the court found:
The repetition of the term together with the other verbal conduct
that is alleged reflected and exacerbated a personal animosity aris-
ing out of the failed relationship rather than anything to do with a
belief by Bullock, of which there is no evidence, that women do not
belong in the work force or are not entitled to equal treatment with
male employees.11 2
The court ruled that "[i]n these circumstances no inference could be
drawn by a reasonable trier of fact that Bullock's behavior, undigni-
fied and unfriendly as it was, created a working environment in which
Galloway could rationally consider herself at a disadvantage in rela-
tion to her male co-workers by virtue of being a woman."'1 13
III. RODGERS AND GALLOWAY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
It should be apparent from the above recitation why I have chosen
the Rodgers and Galloway decisions for testing the thesis that courts
respond differently to seemingly similar claims of hostile environment
discrimination when the alleged harassment is the product of race, as
opposed to sex, discrimination. Both cases, of course, are decisions of
the same court, the Seventh Circuit. In each case, the court was con-
fronted with an epithet coupled with other statements or conduct of a
derogatory nature. In Rodgers, the epithet was "nigger," with the ad-
ditional comment that blacks are "too fucking dumb to be insurance
agents."'114 In Galloway, the epithet was "bitch" or "sick bitch," with
the additional act of an obscene gesture coupled with the comment
"suck this, bitch."" 5 Each case, moreover, arose in a similar proce-
109. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1168.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993).
115. 78 F.3d at 1165.
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dural posture, Galloway on summary judgment 16 and Rodgers on re-
view of the district court's factual findings in favor of the plaintiff. 1 7
The question in each case was not whether the evidence compelled a
finding of unlawful discrimination but whether it could reasonably
support such a finding.
The cases do involve one distinction that might be viewed as signifi-
cant. In Rodgers, but not Galloway, the harasser was the plaintiff's
supervisor. The court emphasized that this added to the severity of
the harassment. 118 On the other hand, Galloway involved the "re-
peated" use of the word "bitch."" 9 Rodgers, by contrast, involved a
handful of racial comments over a twelve-year period of employ-
ment. 20 The repeated use of the epithet in Galloway could well offset
the added sting that might have been present in Rodgers by virtue of
the managerial status of the harasser. 121 This is a point to which I
return later,122 but, for now, it can be fairly said that, the nature of the
discrimination aside, the conduct at issue in these cases is, at the very
least, similar.
While the cases would appear to present parallel claims of racial
and sexual harassment, the reactions of the Seventh Circuit, in the
respective cases, could not have been more different. In Rodgers, the
defendant made a number of arguments designed to diminish the im-
pact of the racial invective by reference to the "context" in which the
comment was made. 23 These attempts met with a chilly response in
the court of appeals. 24 The court ruled that because the word "nig-
ger" "'automatically separates the the person addressed from every
116. Id. at 1168.
117. 12 F.3d at 670.
118. Id. at 675.
119. 78 F.3d at 1165.
120. 12 F.3d at 670-71.
121. It is also noteworthy that the abusive language in Galloway was directed at the plaintiff.
78 F.3d at 1165. In Rodgers, by contrast, the word "nigger," while used in the plaintiff's pres-
ence, was not used in reference to the plaintiff. 12 F.3d at 671. That the unwelcome conduct is
directed at the plaintiff may tend to increase the severity of the harassment. See EEOC Policy
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6681, at 6691; cf. Basker-
ville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that remarks might acquire
a more "sinister cast" when "delivered from so short a distance from the listener's face as to
invade the listener's private space").
122. See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text (arguing that harassment by a co-worker
can be as severe as harassment by a supervisor where the co-worker's harassment is coupled with
a failure on the employer's part to redress the harassment).
123. 12 F.3d at 675-76.
124. Id.
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non-black person,"' the contextual factors invoked by the defendant
were of no force. 125
In Galloway, by contrast, the court stressed that context was "every-
thing. 1 26 The court acknowledged that "'bitch' is rarely used of het-
erosexual males" and that the term is a "pejorative term for
'woman.""' 127 The court also noted that there was no evidence that the
perpetrator had been similarly abusive in his dealings with his male
co-workers.' 28 Nonetheless, the court ruled that, "in context," the
term could not be reasonably viewed as a "sex- or gender-related
term."129
Notably, in rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court in Galloway em-
braced many of the same arguments that had been considered and
rejected in Rodgers. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in these cases of-
fered divergent views on at least three critical issues.
First, the Seventh Circuit took different views of the relevance of
the perpetrator's underlying motivation for the harassing behavior. In
Rodgers, the defendant argued that the statements were not the prod-
uct of a racial animus, in part, because the supervisor had used the
racist language as a "motivational technique.' 30 The court rejected
the argument that the subjective motivation of the harasser would de-
tract in any way from the racial connotation apparent in the words
themselves. To the contrary, in the court's view, "Title VII does not
permit supervisors to use" racially derogatory language as a "motiva-
tional technique.' 31
In Galloway, the harasser's subjective motivation was not only
deemed relevant but central to the existence of a sexually discrimina-
tory work environment. The court stressed that the "verbal conduct
... reflected and exacerbated a personal animosity arising out of the
failed relationship."'1 32 The court opined that one could not "auto-
matic[ally]" infer from the harasser's use of the word "bitch" that he
was "motivated by [the plaintiff's] gender rather than by a personal
dislike unrelated to gender.' 33 In the court's view, a reasonable jury
could not infer a "sexual innuendo" from a male co-worker's use of
the word "bitch," even when coupled with an obscene gesture and the
125. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
126. 78 F.3d at 1168.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1167.
130. 12 F.3d at 675.
131. Id.
132. 78 F.3d at 1168.
133. Id.
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comment "suck this, bitch," absent proof that the term had been used
with the specific intent of signaling that "women do not belong in the
work force or are not entitled to equal treatment with male
employees."' 134
The Seventh Circuit also took different views of how the context of
the particular workplace might affect the meaning and impact of the
epithet. In Rodgers, the defendant argued that the supervisor's use of
the term "nigger" was not inherently racist since the word was used
with frequency by other African-American employees in the work-
place, including Rodgers himself.135 The defendant also maintained
that the severity of the epithet was diminished by the fact that the
supervisor was generally abusive to employees on a race-neutral ba-
sis.136 The court was unimpressed with either argument, stressing that
these factors affected neither the racial character nor the severity of
the epithets. 137
The court in Galloway again took a different path. The evidence
showed that the harasser had not abused "any men.' 38 Yet, the court
imagined a scenario in which the harasser had called a male worker a
"'sick bastard' while calling [Galloway] a 'sick bitch,"' stating that, in
such a case, no rational trier of fact could infer that the harasser "was
making the workplace more uncongenial for women than for men. ' 139
The court also suggested that the term "bitch" might have meanings
other than those associated with "some specific female characteristic"
and, thus, could not be considered an inherently "gendered" term. 40
In the court's view, the relevant "context" could strip the epithet of
both its sexual character and severity.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit reached contrary conclusions in apply-
ing the "severity" requirement. In Rodgers, the evidence showed that
the racial epithets had been used on a few occasions over a period of
twelve years. 141 The defendant argued that the epithets were too iso-
lated to support a finding of a hostile or abusive work environment. 142
The court found that the "cumulative weight" of the "'isolated' racial
comments" was sufficient to sustain a finding of unlawful harassment,
ruling that Rodgers' claim was not "diminished by the lapse of time
134. Id.
135. 12 F.3d at 675-77.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 78 F.3d at 1168.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 12 F.3d at 670-72.
142. Id. at 675.
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between the utterance of the racially offensive remarks and his
resignation." 143
In Galloway, the evidence showed that the harasser had repeatedly
used the word "bitch" over a period of four years. 144 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the harassing conduct was "too tepid or intermit-
tent or equivocal" to be sufficiently severe to support a claim of a
hostile work environment. 45 The co-worker's behavior was "undigni-
fied and unfriendly" but nothing more. 146
In sum, Rodgers and Galloway present what appear to be compara-
ble claims of racial and sexual harassment. The cases, nonetheless,
elicited fundamentally different responses from the two Seventh Cir-
cuit panels. The court in Galloway viewed the sexual epithet in a com-
pletely different light, embracing some of the same arguments of
"context" that had been dismissed in Rodgers.
V. RODGERS AND GALLOWAY: CAN THE DECISIONS
BE RECONCILED?
Having set the scene with a discussion of the Rodgers and Galloway
decisions, I now turn to the critical issue raised by these cases: Is
there a justification for such a disparate response to the use of racial
and sexual epithets? Or, stated differently, can these decisions be
reconciled?
At the outset, I should make clear that I fully support the result in
Rodgers. I agree that the word "nigger," certainly when employed by
a white supervisor, is inherently discriminatory. 147 I agree as well that
even the isolated use of that term, in such a case, can be sufficient to
sustain a finding of a hostile work environment. From my perspective,
then, the issue is not whether Rodgers went too far in imposing liabil-
ity. The issue is whether Galloway fell short of the mark in dismissing
the plaintiff's seemingly comparable claim of sexual harassment. As I
discuss below, I believe that Galloway was wrongly decided and can-
143. Id. at 675, 677.
144. 78 F.3d at 1165.
145. Id. at 1168.
146. Id.
147. Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675. 1 do not mean to imply that the use of such an epithet is, in
every case, a violation of 'Title VII. By "inherently discriminatory," I mean that the term is one
that, on its face, differentiates along racial lines. Whether the use of such a discriminatory term
is sufficiently "pervasive or severe" to affect the terms or conditions of an individual's employ-
ment is largely a question of fact to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. The point is not that the
isolated use of a racial epithet compels a finding of a hostile working environment but that such
use can support a fact finder's determination in the plaintiff's favor.
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not be reconciled with the court's treatment of the race-based claim of
harassment in Rodgers.
A. The Issue of Discrimination
The first issue is whether the "verbal conduct" in Galloway can be
viewed as supporting an inference of sex-based discrimination in the
same way that the epithets in Rodgers supported a finding of race-
based discrimination. In ruling that the term "bitch," in particular, did
not carry with it a "sexual innuendo," Galloway did not mention the
court's previous decision in Rodgers. The court, however, did suggest
some bases for distinguishing Rodgers. Specifically, two grounds for
distinguishing the cases emerge from the Galloway decision: (1) that
the term "bitch," in contrast to "nigger," is not unambiguously dis-
criminatory, thus justifying an examination of the context in which it
was used; and (2) that the term "bitch" was used in a failed sexual
relationship, a factor arguably unique to the gender context.
In assessing the first of these points, it is important to recall the
procedural posture of the Galloway case. Galloway came before the
court of appeals upon the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. 148 The plaintiff was not arguing that the use
of the term "bitch" was discriminatory per se. The issue was whether
the term could support an inference of sex-based discrimination.
Given this standard, the court's holding that the term "bitch" was
"not a sex- or gender-related term"1 49 is, to be generous, mystifying.
"Bitch" is a term derived from its use in describing "the female of the
dog or some other carnivorous mammals."' 50 In human terms, it is
used to describe a "lewd or immoral woman" or a "malicious, spiteful,
and domineering woman.' 15' The court, in Galloway, acknowledged
that "bitch" is "a pejorative term for 'woman.""u 52 It seems beyond
dispute that "bitch" can be reasonably viewed as a "gender-related"
term.
The Galloway court suggested that the use of the word "bitch" was
not actionable because "it does not necessarily connote some specific
female characteristic, whether true, false, or stereotypical."' 53 This
misses the point. First, the issue in Galloway was not whether the
term was "necessarily" discriminatory but whether it might be. Sec-
148. 78 F.3d at 1168.
149. Id. at 1167.
150. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 154 (1988).
151. Id.
152. 78 F.3d at 1168.
153. Id.
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ond, Title VII prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment
action "because of" race or sex.154 It does not require that the action
be specifically tied to a particular characteristic of the protected
group. In Rodgers, for example, the court did not ask whether the
term "nigger" was used in reference to a particular racial characteris-
tic. The court recognized the term for what it was: a pejorative refer-
ence to blacks, as such. "Bitch" is, in a similar way, a pejorative
reference to women.
Further, with all due respect to the court, it is hard to see how the
term "bitch" does not connote a sense that women are "unworthy of
equal dignity and respect."'1 55 "Bitch" may sometimes be used to ref-
erence specific "'woman faults,' ",156 but its meaning transcends the
transcription of specific female faults. It is a generally pejorative term
and, certainly, when spoken by a man to a woman, almost inherently
gender-laden and offensive.
This is not to say that a word, no matter how inherently offensive,
can be divorced entirely from its "context." Even "nigger," for exam-
ple, can be used in certain contexts (for example, among African-
American acquaintances) that do not as directly invoke an offensive,
racial connotation. In Rodgers, the court did not look at contextual
factors beyond noting that the epithets were used by a supervisor, who
was Caucasian and who had also made the comment that the African-
Americans were "too fucking dumb" to be insurance agents.' 57
The context in Galloway was of a comparable nature. The objec-
tionable comments were made by a male who had been romantically
involved with the plaintiff.158 The male not only used the term "sick
bitch," repeatedly, but told the plaintiff to "suck this, bitch," presuma-
bly while gesturing toward his crotch.'5 9 The latter act seems, quite
clearly, to anchor the verbal barrage in a sexually abusive context.
Given this context, it is hard to view the word "bitch" as anything
other than a gender-laden term. If the term "nigger," as used in Rod-
gers, "automatically separate[d]" the plaintiff by race, the term
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
155. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1168.
156. Id. (quoting Beverly Gross, Bitch, SALMAGUNDI, Summer 1994, at 146, 150).
157. The EEOC filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the plaintiff's position in Rodgers.
The EEOC argued that the district court could permissibly find that the supervisor's use of racist
taunts and epithets unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance. Brief of the
EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.
1993), at 11 (Nos. 93-1125 and 93-1266). The EEOC stressed, in particular, that "the use of the
word 'nigger' by a white supervisor is patently offensive," rendering even the isolated use of the
term actionable. Id. at 13.
158. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1665.
159. Id.
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"bitch," as used in Galloway, automatically separated the plaintiff by
gender. 160
In Galloway, the court suggested that there would be no discrimina-
tion if the harasser had used the term "sick bastard" in referring to a
male co-worker.16' The short answer is that there was no evidence
that the harasser had done so. However, let us go with the court's
suggestion. Let us say that the harasser did use the term "sick bas-
tard" or was otherwise abusive in his dealings with male co-workers.
Would this not defeat a claim of a sexually hostile work environment?
The answer, in a word, is "no".
The sexual harassment theory is premised on the assumption that
sexual comments almost invariably connote gender.162 This is true for
160. In Galloway, the court suggested that the term "fucking cunts" was a more "gendered"
term than "bitch," although even the term "cunt," the court suggested, was not inherently sex-
based. See 78 F.3d at 1168 (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (7th
Cir. 1974) as suggesting that a term would not be actionable if "the harasser abuses men in terms
that also are gendered" and suggesting that whether a term is one of sexual harassment may turn
on whether there is anything "else in the case to establish the sexual character of the harass-
ment"). One could make the case that the term "cunt," more so than "bitch," is the gender
parallel for "nigger"; however, in my view, both terms are objectionable and both have an obvi-
ous connection to gender.
161. 78 F.3d at 1168.
162. There is no doubt that the term "sex," as used in Title VII, is a reference to gender. See,
e.g., Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that if a hostile
work environment "is not due to [an employee's] gender, [the employee] has not been the victim
of sex discrimination"); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (ex-
plaining that the language of the Title VII "implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against
women because they are women and against men because they are men"); Quick v. Donaldson
Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (quoting EEOC Dec. No. 76-75 (1976), Empl.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 6495, at 4266); Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the
Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1362. The sexual harassment theory, however,
proceeds from the assumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, unwelcome con-
duct of a sexual nature implicates gender. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Only by reduction ad absurdum could we imagine a case of [sexual] harassment that is
not sex discrimination-where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike.") (citing
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae,
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., No. 91-3655 (11th Cir.), at 24 (stating that the EEOC's
sexual harassment guidelines "presume ... that one's gender is typically implicated by "unwel-
come" conduct "of a sexual nature;" it "would be the rarest of cases in which the proliferation of
sexual comments and materials in a workplace did not differentiate along gender lines"). Of
course, there can be unlawful harassment based on gender, even when the harassment does not
take a sexual form, if women are subjected to harsher working conditions than their male coun-
terparts. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The
critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta-
geous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.");
Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The predicate acts which
support a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim need not be explicitly sexual in na-
ture."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (stressing that hos-
tile work environment claims are "in no way limited ...to intimidation or ridicule of an
explicitly sexual nature"); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
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an obvious reason: In a society that has singled out women, in partic-
ular, as sexual objects, the use of pejorative, sex-based terms almost
invariably differentiates along gender lines. 163 The court's reference,
in Galloway, to "bastard" as a parallel term of harassment merely il-
lustrates the point. "Bastard" has a number of primary meanings that
have nothing to do with gender. 164 Even if gender-based, its use be-
tween men hardly conjures up the same history of sexual abuse as can
the word "bitch" when used by a man in reference to a woman.165
A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 n.55 (1992) ("Most courts have
recognized that harassment that is visited upon someone because of her gender, regardless of the
sexual content, is sex discrimination.").
163. When the harasser is a man and a particular woman is the target of the harassment, it is
easy to see how the harassment is sex- or gender-based. See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp.,
887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995) ("The concept of sexual harassment is an acknowledge-
ment that when a male employer requires a woman to submit to him sexually for a promotion, or
creates a sexually hostile environment, he is discriminating against her on the basis of her gen-
der."). Even when the sexual conduct is not directed at a particular woman (or women), there
are still reasons to assume that the conduct will affect the working conditions of women more so
than of men. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating "women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, [and thus] have a stronger incentive to be
concerned with sexual behavior"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1507 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("Men and women perceive the existence of sexual harassment differ-
ently."); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE 7-8 (1982); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Dis-
crimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1989)
("Hostile environment doctrine must begin from an understanding of the way in which [certain]
practices challenged as sexual harassment are likely to be experienced differently by women than
by men."); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829-30 & nn.62-63 (1991); Marcos-
son, supra note 162, at 18-19 ("The justification for finding sex discrimination in the sexual na-
ture of the harassment is found, in part, in the wealth of data, discussed in sociological and legal
literature, which demonstrates profound differences in attitudes and perceptions (particularly
regarding sexual conduct), and in economic empowerment, between men and women in soci-
ety.") (citing Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reason-
ableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990)); Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451
(1984)).
164. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 34 (1988) (defining "bastard" as "an
illegitimate child"; "something that is spurious, irregular, inferior, or of questionable origin"; "an
offensive or disagreeable person-used as a generalized term of abuse").
165. By emphasizing the male-on-female nature of the harassment, I do not mean to endorse
the view that Title VII does not cover harassment when the harasser is of the same gender as the
victim, an issue that has divided the courts. Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding Title VII does not recognize a claim for same-gender harass-
ment), and Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I1. 1988) (same), with Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding claim for same-gender harassment
was cognizable under Title VII), Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (same), King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161,167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same), Nogueras
v. University of P. R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (D.P.R. 1995) (same), Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1135-37 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (same), and EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F.
Supp. 1100, 1101-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (same). Other courts have addressed related issues. See
McWilliams v. Fairfax County of Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that harassment among heterosexuals of the same gender is not actionable under Title
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It is revealing, in this regard, that the court in Rodgers saw no signif-
icance in the fact that the isolated racial comments had been mixed in
with a barrage of race-neutral abuse. The court stressed that even in
the midst of the generally abusive environment, the racial slurs re-
tained their sting. Would the result have been different if the supervi-
sor, in addressing white employees, had added the term "honkie" to
the mix? Not likely. The word "nigger" "conjure[s] up the entire his-
tory of racial discrimination in this country."'166 The racist nature of
that term would not be diminished, to any significant degree, by the
use of the relatively benign "honkie."
The differing approaches of the courts, on this issue, confirm the
point made earlier in this Article.167 In the race context, courts typi-
cally resolve ambiguities concerning the racial nature of the harass-
ment in favor of the plaintiff. Courts, in the sexual context, are much
more inclined to give close scrutiny to the underlying motivation of
the individual engaging in the harassing behavior. Such additional
scrutiny is unjustified. Terms of an explicitly sexual nature are suffi-
cient, at the very least, to support an inference of sex discrimination.
This leads to the second possible distinction between the two cases:
that the harassment stemmed from a failed "personal relationship."'1 68
It should be noted, at the outset, that courts have often expressed a
concern that the sexual harassment theory not intrude upon the per-
VII, while leaving open the possibility that "same-sex discrimination" may be covered "where
either victim or oppressor, or both, are homosexual or bisexual"); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l
Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting in passing that "[slexual harassment of women by
men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harass-
ment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not be actiona-
ble"). Title VII is violated whenever "'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed,"' Kopp
v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d at 269 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)), which can include cases in which the harasser is of the same
gender as the victim. On the other hand, the fact that the harasser and the victim are of the
same gender might make the harassment's connection to gender less apparent, in a particular
case, although not impossible to show. Cf. Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012,
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that while Title VII covers discrimination against Caucasian em-
ployees, the requisite factual proof differs for the Caucasian employee, since one cannot as read-
ily draw an inference of discrimination from the elements of the prima facie case). It might also
render the effect of the harassment less severe unless, in the case at hand, the harassment con-
jures up some other history of gender-related subjugation. See Marcosson, supra note 162, at 24-
25 & n.94 (arguing that workplace harassment of gays and lesbians "reinforces stereotypes about
appropriate gender roles," thus adding to "'society's pressure to conform to heterosexuality"')
(quoting SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 17 (1988)).
166. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. III. 1984).
167. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (discussing the degree to which courts, in
the context of racial harassment claims, take a more lenient view of the type of comment or
statement that is sufficient without more to support an inference of discrimination).
168. Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996).
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sonal, consensual relations of co-workers. 169 Courts have stressed that
Title VII applies only to sexual conduct of a coercive nature.170
Courts have warned that if the sexual harassment theory is not con-
fined to carefully defined limits, the statute will become a device for
policing the normal give-and-take of interpersonal relations in the
workplace. 171
While these concerns may have merit, they do not justify the court's
rationale in Galloway. First, the law already contains a bulwark
against unwarranted intrusions upon personal relationships: the re-
quirement that the harassing behavior be "unwelcome."'172 In the race
context, the "unwelcomeness" requirement, although present, is al-
most never at issue.173 In the sex context, however, plaintiffs occa-
sionally find their cases defeated on the threshold issue of the
"unwelcomeness" of the sexual conduct. 74 Evidence that the plaintiff
has invited the conduct, by her own actions, or that the conduct is part
169. See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating that "sexual relationships between co-workers should not be subject to Title VII scru-
tiny, so long as they are personal, social relationships") (citing Preamble to Interim Guidelines on
Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed. Reg. 25024 (1980)).
170. See id. at 307-08; see also EEOC Policy Guidance No. N-915-048, EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) N:5051, at 5052-53 (Jan. 1990) (stressing that Title VII "does not prohibit isolated in-
stances of preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships" but does pro-
hibit favoritism "based upon coerced sexual conduct").
171. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1331 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dissenting) (expres-
sing concern that an employer should not be forced into "monitoring or policing his employees'
voluntary sexual relationships"), affd sub nom., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
172. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995) (defining sexual harassment as "[ulnwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature").
173. In race cases, courts have formulated the standard to include a requirement that the
harassment be "unwelcome." Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991)
(quoting the standards enunciated in Daniels v. Essex Group, 740 F. Supp. 553, 560-61 (N.D.
Ind. 1990)). Rarely, however, does the "unwelcomeness" issue come into play. This may be one
area where there are grounds for distinguishing, to some degree, between claims of racial and
sexual harassment. While one can imagine a workplace where a small level of racial teasing is
tolerated by African-Americans and Caucasians alike, the use of a racial epithet, particularly by
a white worker, is unlikely to be welcomed. On the other hand, a certain amount of ribald
repartee (not to mention overt flirtation) is a part of the sexual dynamic for at least some indi-
viduals, male and female alike. It seems likely that if the unwelcomeness requirement is to have
much application at all, it will be in the sexual context.
174. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991); Ukarish v. Magnesium Electron,
33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,087, at 32, 118 (D.N.J. 1983); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 27
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $ 32,379, at 23,648 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirma-
tive Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1177 (M.D. Pa. 1982); see also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 (stressing
that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome"'); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 n.13 (9th Cir. 1991) ("If sexual comments or
sexual advances are in fact welcomed by the recipient, they, of course, do not constitute sexual
harassment. Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment does not require a to-
tally desexualized work place.").
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of the normal give and take of a sexual tryst, encouraged by the plain-
tiff's own behavior, can support a finding that the alleged harassment
is not "unwelcome" and, thus, not actionable.
In Galloway, the court considered the issue of whether the plain-
tiff's claim was defeated by "her own coarse remarks" to the harasser
"and others."'1 75 The court ruled, correctly in my view, that the plain-
tiff had not "welcomed" the conduct by her own "defensive" reactions
to the alleged harassment. 176 Having ruled in the plaintiff's favor on
this point, the court should have been satisfied that the harassing con-
duct was not the uncoerced product of a soured personal relationship.
Further, the notion that Galloway's claim could be defeated by evi-
dence that the harasser was acting out of "personal animosity" rather
than a "belief" that "women do not belong in the work force" 177 pre-
supposes that the proper focus, in a hostile environment case, is on the
subjective motivation of the harasser. However, in cases of this na-
ture, the law assumes the point of view of the victim, not of the har-
asser. 78 In Rodgers, the court recognized this principle, flatly
rejecting the defendant's argument that the racial epithets could be
dismissed because of the "nonracist" motivations of the harasser. In
contrast to this view, the court in Galloway shifted the focus to the
putative motivations of the harasser, thereby ignoring the obvious sex-
ual connotation in the epithet itself.
Indeed, the Galloway court's distinction between "abuse of a
woman" that is "motivated by her gender rather than by a personal
dislike unrelated to gender"'179 splits too fine a hair. Harassment is
often the product of some personal animus. Where the harassment
does not take the form of a racist or sexual statement or act, it is not
actionable under Title VII, absent proof that the harasser selectively
targeted members of one race or sex.' 80 Where, however, the harasser
employs racial or sexual means, in carrying out his vendetta, Title VII
comes into play, since the harassment, by its very nature, differenti-
ates along racial or gender lines. In such a case, the plaintiff's claim is
175. 78 F.3d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 1167.
177. Id. at 1168.
178. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898
F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
179. 78 F.3d at 1168.
180. See Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting
that "Rodgers would not have an action under Title VII if Mann had not mixed racist comments
into his daily routine of race-neutral verbal abuse").
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viable regardless of whether the harasser acted out of racial or sexual
hatred or a personal animus.
Again, let us accept the court's invitation. Let us assume that the
fact that the co-worker in Galloway acted from "personal dislike," fol-
lowing a "soured" romantic relationship, is critical to the inquiry.
Does this deprive the abuse of any "gender" content?
The answer is an emphatic "no" for reasons that, once again, expose
the gap between the Rodgers and Galloway decisions. The Galloway
court assumed that if the abuse stemmed from a failed personal rela-
tionship, it could not be seen as disadvantaging the plaintiff "in rela-
tion to her male co[-]workers by virtue of being a woman. '' 181 This,
however, ignores the unfortunate history of male-female relations.
Men have a history of abusing women and are prone to do so, most
often, in the context of failed (or failing) personal relationships. t82 In
that context, the use of the derogatory word "bitch" or the phrase
"suck this, bitch," can, in the mind of a reasonable woman, conjure up
the entire history of male-on-female abuse. Indeed, if such language
is repeated, as it was in Galloway, a woman may reasonably feel that
the verbal abuse is a prelude to physical violence.1 83 The fact that the
abuse flows out of a failed personal relationship, rather than diminish-
ing the sexual character or severity of the abuse, may actually serve to
heighten it.
In Rodgers, the court understood the history that was conjured up
by the term "nigger." The court recognized that the use of the word in
the workplace could erode the "self-esteem" of a black employee.' 84
The Galloway court was unable to see the parallel history of subjuga-
tion conjured up by the co-worker's sexually abusive conduct. The
result was that the Galloway court, under the rubric of "context,"
turned on its head what should have been a simple issue: whether the
term "bitch" can reasonably be perceived as a term that carries "some
sexual innuendo.' 8 5
181. 78 F.3d at 1168.
182. See Don Colburn, Domestic Violence; AMA President Decries 'A Major Public Health
Problem', WASH. POST, June 28, 1994, at Z10.
183. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "because women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault," women "who are victims of mild forms of
sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude
to violent sexual assault").
184. 12 F.3d at 677.
185. 78 F.3d at 1168.
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B. The Issue of Severity
If Galloway cannot be defended on the threshold issue of discrimi-
nation, what about the court's ruling that the repeated use of the word
"bitch" was not sufficiently severe to implicate the protections of Title
VII? Again, the court did not distinguish the prior decision in Rod-
gers, wherein the court considered the much more isolated racial epi-
thets sufficiently severe to have altered the terms and conditions of
the plaintiff's employment. Two possible distinctions, however,
emerge from the Galloway decision: (1) that the harasser in Galloway
was a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, thus diminishing the impact
of the harassment; and (2) that the term "bitch" is not as offensive as
the term "nigger," particularly when used in the context of a failed
personal relationship.
At first glance, the first of these distinctions would appear to have
some merit. In Rodgers, the court reasoned that a supervisor's use of
the word "nigger" "impacts the work environment far more severely
than use by co-equals. '1 86 The court stressed that the insults "flowed
from the mouth of a supervisor-indeed, the highest ranking em-
ployee in the [plaintiff's] office."' 87 In Galloway, the court suggested
that the "verbal conduct," coming from a co-worker, did not enforce a
view that "women do not belong in the work force or are not entitled
to equal treatment with male employees."'1 88
While there is no denying the injury inflicted by a management offi-
cial's use of a racist epithet, the fact that the harassment in Galloway
emanated from a co-worker is less significant than it first appears.
Under Title VII, an employer is liable for co-worker harassment only
if the employer itself has reason to be aware of the harassment and
fails to take adequate steps to redress it.189 The plaintiff in Galloway
was not arguing that the co-worker's use of abusive language, by itself,
violated Title VII. The plaintiff was arguing that the employer vio-
lated Title VII by "failing to protect her" from the harassment. 190 The
plaintiff could prevail on that claim only by proving that a hostile envi-
186. 12 F.3d at 675.
187. Id. at 677.
188. 78 F.3d at 1168.
189. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995); Burns v. McGregor
Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir.
1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995).
190. 78 F.3d at 1165.
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ronment existed' 9' and that the employer, fairly charged with knowl-
edge of the harassment, failed to take action to remedy it.192
The Galloway court dismissed the plaintiff's claim without address-
ing the adequacy of the employer's response to the alleged harass-
ment. Assuming, however, that the evidence showed that the
employer failed to take action in response to the plaintiff's complaints,
the effect on the plaintiff could be substantial. To be subjected to an
offensive epithet by a supervisor is no doubt harmful. To be told ef-
fectively by your employer, however, that the use of an offensive
epithet by a co-worker is tolerated can be equally humiliating. In fact,
in some respects, the impact may be worse since the supervisor's con-
duct might be viewed as unique to the supervisor, while the em-
ployer's failure to respond can be seen as part of an institutional
insensitivity to the kind of workplace harassment at issue.193 A co-
worker's repeated use of offensive language, coupled with the em-
ployer's failure to redress the harassment, can have as severe an im-
pact on an individual as the use of offensive language directly by a
supervisor or manager.
The second distinction suggested above has, in some respects, al-
ready been addressed. The court in Galloway placed substantial reli-
ance on the fact that the abuse flowed from a failed personal
relationship both in ruling that the abuse did not have any "sexual
innuendo" and in finding that the abuse was too "tepid or intermittent
or equivocal" to be actionable.1 94 Yet, as noted above, the fact that
the abuse stems from a failed sexual relationship, if anything, height-
ens both the sexual character and severity of the harassment by evok-
ing the history of male-on-female abuse prevalent in the very context
of a failed relationship. 195 If context is, indeed, "everything," as stated
in Galloway,196 the "context" in that case enhanced, rather than di-
minished, the severity of the co-worker's harassment.
What about the general issue of whether the term "bitch" is as in-
herently offensive as the term "nigger"? "Nigger" is a patently offen-
191. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
192. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431-32; Burns, 989 F.2d at 966; Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d).
193. In Rodgers, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had ever reported the harassment to
a company official. Liability was imposed on the employer on the theory that "racial harassment
by a [company official] at a decision-making level in the corporate hierarchy" is directly attribu-
table to the employer. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 635 (E.D.
Wis. 1992) (citing Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (dicta)).
194. 78 F.3d at 1168.
195. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
196. 78 F.3d at 1168.
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sively term. It is uniquely tied to the history of racial oppression in
this country, a history that may be unparalleled in its degree of abuse
and degradation. It is difficult to quarrel with the statement in Rod-
gers that "[perhaps] no single act can more quickly 'alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment,'
than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as 'nigger' by a
supervisor in the presence of his subordinates." 197
On the other hand, the fact that "nigger" is an offensive term does
not diminish the impact of a term such as "bitch." The term "nigger"
might be viewed as more inherently objectionable than the term
"bitch." In that sense, there may be a small range of cases where the
isolated use of the word "nigger" is sufficiently "severe" to create a
hostile working environment, while the isolated use of the word
"bitch" is not. This minor concession, however, in no way justifies the
tolerance of the type of repeated abuse at issue in Galloway, nor does
it support the view that racial harassment claims are of a fundamen-
tally different stripe. No two words have precisely the same meaning.
No two groups have suffered precisely the same discrimination. The
differences between racial and sexual discrimination, whatever they
may be, do not justify the gaping disparities in approach revealed by
the Rodgers and Galloway decisions. 198
In truth, the Galloway court's reference to "failed personal relation-
ships" may say something much more fundamental than is readily ap-
parent at first glance about the disparate responses of courts to claims
of racial and sexual harassment. Racist epithets have been an unfor-
tunate part of this country's history. The use of such epithets, how-
ever, is increasingly on the wane, even in private discourse.199 The use
of sexually abusive language, by contrast, appears to be as prevalent
as ever, at least in private conversation and particularly in reference to
women who are at the other end of a "failed personal relationship.
200
197. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
198. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(stressing that the law should treat claims of sex discrimination in the same fashion as it does
claims of race discrimination "except in the rare case in which a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion is shown").
199. My support for this statement comes from my own experience. I rarely hear a racial
epithet even in my interactions with individuals who signal hostility toward minority group mem-
bers. On the other hand, some of the same individuals who would never use a racial epithet in
referring to a member of a minority group have no qualms about using sexually derogatory
language in reference to particular women.
200. The prevalence of sexually derogatory language may be illustrated, most dramatically, by
the frequent use of such language by male "rappers" and "hip-hop" artists. See William Bennett
et al., Rap Rubbish, USA TODAY, June 6, 1996, at 13A.
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One might argue that the very prevalence of terms like "bitch," in
common usage, diminishes the impact of these terms when trans-
ported to the workplace.
The problem with this, of course, is that it fossilizes the current
levels of societal acceptance into a legal standard. It is not so long ago
that racist epithets were not out of bounds, even in public discourse.201
This has changed, in part, because the law has transformed people's
attitudes or at least affected the perception of what is acceptable dis-
course. The law could have a similarly transforming effect with re-
spect to sexually derogatory language if courts were to insist upon the
same "no tolerance" policy that has been the hallmark of the judici-
ary's response to claims of racial harassment.202
This, then, is the final contrast between the Rodgers and Galloway
decisions. In Rodgers, the court showed no tolerance for a racist
epithet, even when used a handful of times over a twelve-year period.
In Galloway, the court tolerated a sexist epithet used repeatedly over
a much shorter time frame. Rather than using Title VII to transform
workplace behavior, as did the court in Rodgers, the court in Gallo-
way acquiesced in the toleration of the harasser's sexually abusive
language.
V. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF
TITLE VII: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
As I noted above, my aim in this Article is not merely to contrast
the results in the Rodgers and Galloway cases. I also seek to use these
cases to make a broader point about the disparate responses of courts
to claims of racial and sexual harassment. The above discussion sug-
gests a number of broader issues raised by the Rodgers and Galloway
decisions.
201. In one of the most notorious examples, Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, who
served well into the twentieth century, peppered his public statements with the word "nigger"
and other racial and ethnic slurs. See DAVID BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR 77-78
(1988).
202. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's "no tolerance"
policy with respect to the use of racial epithets). Notably, the judiciary's aversion to racial epi-
thets extends to other evidentiary issues arising in Title VII cases. Courts, for example, have
been quick to infer from a manager's use of the word "nigger" that the manager's subsequent
decision to take adverse employment action against an African-American employee was racially
based. See, e.g., Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861-62 & n.8 (5th Cir.
1993). Courts have also sustained findings of constructive discharge, based on the use of racial
epithets, even where the few incidents of harassment recalled by the plaintiff occurred several
years before his resignation. See Taylor v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188,
1190-94, 1189, 1206 (7th Cir. 1992). Decisions like these provide employers with a strong incen-
tive to purge the workplace of racially abusive language.
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The first point that emerges from these decisions, and others, 20 3 is
that courts have a discomfort with the sexual harassment theory that
does not seem to surface in the context of race-based claims of hostile
environment discrimination. This discomfort may stem from the very
fact that the harassment is of a sexual nature. Courts may have con-
cerns that they not be forced into policing the sexual give and take
that is a normal part of the courting ritual. Courts may feel that sex-
ual conduct is more prone to ambiguity precisely because of the sub-
tleties of the sexual dynamic. The very pervasiveness of sexually
derogatory speech may lead courts to conclude that a certain degree
of even unwanted sexual conduct is inevitable. Courts may feel, in
particular, that employers cannot be fairly "saddled with the insur-
mountable task" of conforming employee conduct to some legal norm
of permissible sexual conduct, 204 at least to the same degree that they
are required to purge the workplace of racist behavior.
Throughout this Article, I have sought to show that these concerns
are misplaced. The concern that courts will be forced into policing
every sexual exchange in the workplace is met by, among other things,
the requirement that the harassment be "unwelcome. '20 5 While pun-
dits often talk of the dangers of converting every sexual misunder-
standing into a federal case,206 the reported cases rarely involve the
ambiguous sexual advance or comment. More typical is what oc-
curred in Galloway. The repeated use of the word "bitch," the grab-
bing of the genital area, and the crude demand for sexual submission
hardly seem the product of a simple "misunderstanding" between the
sexes. The law should not be so demanding that it leaves no room for
the mixed signal or the occasional "off-color" joke or remark. Nor
should it permit, under the rubric of "context" or "ambiguity," the
type of crude, offensive, and pervasive abuse tolerated in Galloway.
203. See supra notes 31-58 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' general approach to
claims of racial and sexual harassment).
204. Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1995).
205. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the "unwelcomeness" require-
ment). No doubt, an overly aggressive application of the "unwelcomeness" requirement has its
own pitfalls. Implying that a woman has "welcomed" the harassment by her dress or sexual
demeanor conjures up the ugly history of the law's treatment of rape complainants. See gener-
ally Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1977) (discussing the treatment of rape victims during trial and the legislature's effort
to shield them). In my view, the "unwelcomeness" requirement, while it has meaning, should be
reserved for a relatively small number of cases where the record clearly shows that the plaintiff,
by her own interactions (not her dress or general sexual demeanor) has welcomed the specific
sexual conduct at issue. Cf. supra note 173 (stating "that if the unwelcomeness requirement is to
have much application at all, it will be in the sexual context").
206. See Nat Hentoff, A 'Pinup' of His Wife, WASH. POST, June 5, 1993, at A21.
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The concern that sexual misconduct is too pervasive in society at
large to be regulated effectively in the workplace is equally unavailing.
The very purpose of Title VII is to restrict in the workplace what
might be viewed as acceptable (or at least permissible) in other, more
personal settings. That employers may have to bear the brunt of en-
forcing workplace norms is inherent in Title VII's liability standards.
Title VII does not make an employer strictly liable for co-worker har-
assment, no matter how egregious.2 07 What Title VII requires is that
the employer, once it is charged with knowledge of the harassment,
take adequate steps to redress such harassment. Within these con-
straints, it is fair to require employers to play the same private "en-
forcement" role in the sexual context as they have in the racial context
and fair to hold them responsible for failing to carry out that role.
Of course, saying that the employer can be made to enforce the
standards of Title VII presupposes that courts are willing themselves
to impose the standards. For courts to impose the level of protection
that I believe Title VII requires, however, they must be able to see the
history of abuse and subjugation that is evoked by objectionable sex-
ual language and conduct. In the race context, courts have been able
to see how even a single word can prove injurious to an African-
American employee. In the sex context, grasping the meaning of de-
rogatory conduct has proven more elusive. This, if nothing else, is the
lesson of Rodgers and Galloway.
Why is it that courts cannot perceive the history of sexual abuse
with the same clarity that characterizes their response to racially
harassing behavior? One might argue that the problem is the small
number of female judges on the federal bench.208 Yet, most federal
judges are also Caucasian209 and still seem able to understand, often
207. See supra note 94 (discussing the standard of liability for cases of co-worker harassment).
Even in cases where the harasser is a supervisor, employer liability is not absolute; see also
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that an employer is directly
liable for harassment where the supervisor creates "a discriminatorily abusive work environment
through the use of his delegated authority").
208. While as of 1994, only fourteen percent of federal judges were women, President Clinton
has nominated far more females than any of his predecessors, including forty percent during the
first year of his administration. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatly, Rethinking Feminist
Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 920 nn.1-2 (1995); see also Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 309-16 (1996) (comparing President Clinton's record on
nominating women for federal judgeships with those of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Carter).
The argument that sexual harassment doctrine has been influenced by a "gender bias in the
courts" is made in David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 147
(1995) (noting that "[m]ost federal court judges are men").
209. James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 202
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with great sensitivity, the harm inflicted by the racial epithet. Perhaps
this is simply a case where the story of racial oppression has been
more effectively told and the lessons more deeply embedded in our
common understandings. 210 Whatever the case, the relative inability
of courts to understand the nature of the harm inflicted by sexually
demeaning conduct leaves working women vulnerable to conduct that
is as offensive to women as the most severe racial epithet is to Afri-
can-Americans.
Another case from the Seventh Circuit, Saxton v. American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co.,211 illustrates the point. In Saxton, the plain-
tiff had been hired to work for the defendant's Design Engineering
Staff.212 One of the defendant's managers began making unwelcome
sexual advances.21 3 On one occasion, the manager, having invited
Saxton for drinks to discuss work-related matters, "placed his hand on
Saxton's leg above the knee several times," "rubbed his hand along
her upper thigh," "kissed her for two to three seconds," and "put his
hand on [her] leg once or twice more during the ride home," all over
Saxton's objection.21 4 A few weeks later, the manager invited Saxton
to lunch to discuss work-related matters but then detoured to an arbo-
retum, leaving the car to take a walk.21 5 When Saxton removed her-
self from the car and began walking, the manager "'lurched' at her
from behind some bushes, as if to grab her," prompting Saxton to
"dash[ ] several feet away in order to avoid him. '216 After Saxton
complained about these incidents, the manager became "sullen,"
changing his behavior toward her at work.2 17 The manager "refused
to speak with her, treated her in a condescending manner, and teased
her about her romantic interest in a co[-]worker. ''218
(1996) (noting that as of July, 1994, ninety percent of the 164 federal appellate court judges were
Caucasian, and approximately eighty-five percent of the 573 federal district court judges were
Caucasian).
210. For a discussion of this general point, see CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT OF WORKING WOMEN 127-41 (1979).
The primary point of reference for antidiscrimination law has not been the social situa-
tion and experience of women, but that of black Americans, or at least black men....
Judges have become conscious of many attitudes and practices as unquestionably racist
which are allowed to persist in their corresponding sexist forms.
Id. at 127-28.
211. 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
212. Id. at 528.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 528 & n.3.
215. Id. at 528.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 528-29.
218. Id. at 529.
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On this record, the court of appeals concluded that Saxton's proof
was insufficient even to survive a motion for summary judgment.219
The court noted that "'[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.' '220 The court ruled that
even assuming "that the conduct at issue had a sufficiently adverse
effect on Saxton, her claim must still fail, as the objective prong of the
inquiry is not satisfied. '221 The court stressed that the manager's of-
fensive behavior was "relatively limited, presumably because Saxton
was forthright and persistent in making clear that the advances were
unwelcome," and not "severe" enough, in its own right, to "create an
objectively hostile work environment. '222
In some ways, Saxton may be a more troubling decision than Gallo-
way. One can debate whether a term like "bitch" is, in isolation, as
offensive as the word "nigger." Surely acts of unwelcome physical
contact are, however, on par with even the most offensive racial
epithet. The unwelcome physical groping of a woman's body, particu-
larly in a remote setting of a male's choice, as in Saxton,223 can conjure
up the entire history of violence against women. At the very least, it
can be insulting and demeaning, reducing the woman to a sexual ob-
ject and stripping her of her professional dignity. In Saxton, the court
seemed unable to grasp these meanings, stating only that the conduct
was "inappropriate and unprofessional. 22 4 This is clearly inconsistent
with the condemnation of the isolated racial epithets at issue in
Rodgers.225
How, then, can decisions like Saxton and Galloway be avoided?
First, courts must lose their misplaced discomfort with the sexual har-
assment theory. Second, courts must make an effort to understand
219. Id. at 537. It is worth noting that the author of the Saxton opinion, Judge Ilana Diamond
Rovner, is a woman. Id. at 528; see supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (questioning
whether the small number of female judges is the primary cause of the relative insensitivity of
courts to claims of sexual harassment).
220. 10 F.3d at 534 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 528 & n.3.
224. Id. at 537.
225. This is not to say that there was not another way to view the evidence in Saxton. The
court insinuated, without saying, that the plaintiff may have welcomed the sexual advances by
her own flirtatious behavior with the supervisor. Id. at 528 (suggesting that before the incidents
at issue, the plaintiff had received a job that seemed beyond her level of qualification after
having had lunch with the supervisor "several times"). The court, however, did not rule on this
point and never gave the fact finder the opportunity to assess whether the plaintiff's objections
to the physical harassment were, under the circumstances, reasonable. Id. at 534, 537.
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the meanings inherent in sexually derogatory comments or conduct.
226
It is tempting to say that judges must look beyond their own life ex-
periences, to "walk a mile" in the shoes of those who have suffered
sexual indignities. The answer, however, may lie closer to home.
How many judges, as employers, would repeatedly use the type of
language at issue in Galloway? How many judges, as employers,
would engage in the type of behavior at issue in Saxton? How many
judges, as employers, would tolerate such conduct, by others, in their
own workplaces? The answer, I hope (and think), is very few. Yet,
these same judges, as judges, seem willing to tolerate such behavior to
a degree not replicated in the race context, based apparently on the
perception that in the "rough and tumble" world of many workplaces,
a certain degree of sexually abusive behavior is inevitable. 227 If there
are workplaces where sexually crude behavior persists, it is the judges,
armed with Title VII, who have the power to make a change.
Title VII has the power to transform workplace behavior. Until
courts transform their own thinking and place sexual harassment on
the same plane as racial harassment, however, the statute will not live
up to its full potential as a device for "eliminating prejudices and bi-
ases in our society. ' '228
CONCLUSION
Title VII "affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. '229 On pa-
per, this right extends equally to claims of racial and sexual harass-
ment. In practice, the judicial response to claims of sexual harassment
falls short of the mark set by the race cases. The decisions in Rodgers
and Galloway illustrate this disparity. The law should strive for a
more unified approach, in practice, to comparable claims of race- and
sex-based harassment.
226. 1 do not mean to raise the debate over whether the impact of harassment should be
assessed from the perspective of a "reasonable woman," as opposed to "reasonable person."
Compare Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the perspective of a
"reasonable woman"), with id. at 884-85 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (arguing against a "reasonable
woman" standard because "[w]hether a man or woman has sensibilities peculiar to the person
and what they are is not necessarily known"). Courts can apprehend the effect that sexually
derogatory conduct may have on a female complainant without assuming the stance of a hypo-
thetical "reasonable woman."
227. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (stressing that
"[s]peech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the
floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments").
228. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988).
229. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).

